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THE JUDICIAL BETRAYAL OF BLACKS––AGAIN: 
THE SUPREME COURT’S DESTRUCTION OF THE 
HOPES RAISED BY BROWN V. BOARD OF 
EDUCATION 
Nathaniel R. Jones∗
On May 17, 1954, the United States Supreme Court handed down its 
historic decision in Brown v. Board of Education,
 
1 and almost immediately 
officials of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored 
People met in Atlanta, Georgia, to celebrate and to confer.  On May 23 and 
24, they met to plan for a future filled with hope.  With the firm belief that 
their goals could be realized in the wake of Brown, they issued a statment 
that has come to be known as the “Atlanta Declaration.”2
Over time, this document has been obscured, to an extent that few 
students of civil rights are familiar with it.  But this declaration is, in fact, 
the most authentic and definitive commentary on the hopes of black 
Americans following Brown.  The NAACP, with other individuals, 
developed a strategy and embarked on a mission to eradicate the pernicious 
separate-but-equal doctrine that had been enunciated as the law of the land 
in Plessy v. Ferguson,
 
3
No commemoration of Brown can be credible, nor can the decision be 
evaluated effectively at this point in history, without revisiting and 
 a decision in which the Court ignominiously 
betrayed the hopes of black Americans. 
 
∗ Nathaniel Jones is currently a senior partner at Blank Rome, LLP in the commercial 
litigation group.  From 1979-2002, he served as a U.S. Circuit Judge for the Sixth Circuit.  
Nathaniel Jones was general counsel for the NAACP from 1969-1979, and held a position 
as Assistant United States Attorney for the Northern District of Ohio from 1960-67.  Mr. 
Jones received his A.B. from Youngstown State University in 1951, and his J.D. from 
Youngstown State University Law School in 1956.  Mr. Jones has written extensively on 
Brown v. Board of Education, including the articles Is Brown Obsolete?, Milliken v. 
Bradley: Brown’s Troubled Journey Forth, and Whither Goest Judicial Nominations, Brown 
or Plessy?–– Advice and Consent Revisited. 
 1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Brown I). 
 2. Statement by the NAACP (May 24, 1954) reprinted in THE CRISIS 198 (1979) (with 
the title Atlanta Declaration) (on file with the author) [hereinafter Atlanta Declaration]. 
 3. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
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understanding the Atlanta Declaration.  The full text of the declaration 
reads: 
We, as representatives of the National Association for the Advancement 
of Colored People from seventeen Southern and Border States and the 
District of Columbia, have assembled here in Atlanta, Georgia, May 22-
23, for the purpose of collectively developing a program to meet the vital 
and urgent issues arising out of the historic United States Supreme Court 
decision of May 17 banning segregation in public schools. 
All Americans are now relieved to have the law of the land declare in the 
clearest language: “. . . in the field of public education the doctrine of 
‘separate but equal’ has no place.  Separate educational facilities are 
inherently unequal.”  Segregation in public education is now not only 
unlawful; it is un-American.  True Americans are grateful for this 
decision.  Now that the law is made clear, we look to the future.  Having 
canvassed the situation in each of our States, we approach the future with 
the utmost confidence.  This confidence is based upon the many factors 
including the pledges of support and compliance by governors, attorney 
generals, mayors, and education officials; and by enlightened guidance of 
newspapers, radio, television and other organs of public communication 
and comment. 
We stand ready to work with other law-abiding citizens who are anxious 
to translate this decision into a program of action to eradicate racial 
segregation in public education as speedily as possible. 
We are instructing all of our branches in every affected area to petition 
their local school boards to abolish segregation without delay and to assist 
these agencies in working out ways and means of implementing the 
Court’s ruling.  The total resources of the NAACP will be made available 
to facilitate this great project of ending the artificial separation of 
America’s children on the irrelevant basis of race and color. 
While we recognize that school officials will have certain administrative 
problems in transferring from a segregated to a non-segregated system, 
we will resist the use of any tactics contrived for the sole purpose of 
delaying desegregation. 
In pursuit of our objectives, we will accelerate our community action 
program to win public acceptance of the Court’s desegregation order from 
all segments of the population.  To this end, we are confident of the 
support of teachers, parents, labor, church, civic, fraternal, social, 
business and professional organizations. 
We insist that there should be integration at all levels including the 
assignment of teacher-personnel on a non-discriminatory basis. The 
fullest resources of the Association, including the legal staff, the research 
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staff and educational specialists on the staff, will be utilized to insure that 
there will be no discrimination against teachers as a result of integration. 
We are aware that our region has been over-burdened in its effort to 
provide education for all children—in part because of the dual system—
and accordingly, we strongly support Federal aid to assist our states in the 
building of new schools and the expansion of educational facilities for all 
our children, provided that any such legislation contains the necessary 
safeguards to insure the distribution of funds in accordance with the 
requirements of the Court’s decision. 
We look upon this memorable decision not as a victory for Negroes alone, 
but for the whole American people and as a vindication of America’s 
leadership of the free world. 
Lest there be any misunderstanding of our position, we here rededicate 
ourselves to the removal of all racial segregation in public education and 
reiterate our determination to achieve this goal without compromise of 
principle.4
In these confident words, the hopes engendered by Brown are clear. 
 
The efforts of the declarants to give meaning to that hope would include 
many struggles to obtain compliance with Brown.  They began in the states 
of the Old Confederacy and in Delaware, Kansas, and the District of 
Columbia.5  Slowly, the geographic scope of their efforts was expanded to 
include, for example, Little Rock, Arkansas, where a momentous battle was 
waged to overcome the attempt by Arkansas Governor Orval Faubus to 
nullify federal judicial power to implement Brown’s mandate.6  That 
attempt caused the Supreme Court to reaffirm, in 1958,7 the power of the 
federal courts, a power that had initially been articulated by Chief Justice 
John Marshall in the celebrated case of Marbury v. Madison in 1803.8
The blatant obstruction by the state government against a clear 
 
 
 4. Atlantic Declaration, supra note 2. 
 5. Nathaniel R. Jones, Civil Rights After Brown: “The Stormy Road We Trod,” in 
RACE IN AMERICA: THE STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 102 (Herbert Hill & James E. Jones eds., 
1993). 
 6. David S. Tatel, Judicial Methodology, Southern School Desegregation and the Rule 
of Law, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1071, 1083 (2004). 
 7. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).  In Cooper, the Court noted that it “made 
plain” in Brown “that delay in any guise in order to deny the constitutional rights of Negro 
children could not be countenanced, and that only a prompt start, diligently and earnestly 
pursued, to eliminate racial segregation from the public schools could constitute good faith 
compliance.”  Id. at 7.  Accordingly, state officials were “duty bound to devote every effort 
toward initiating desegregation and bringing about the elimination of racial discrimination 
in the public school system.”  Id. 
 8. 5 U.S. 137 (1803). 
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pronouncement of the federal courts caused the Supreme Court to reaffirm, 
initially, its dedication to upholding the rights of black children.  Thus, the 
early hopes raised by Brown appeared to be justified.  The federal courts 
not only appeared committed to overcoming the massive harm inflicted on 
black children by segregated schools, but they also appeared willing and 
able to overcome the massive resistance of state and local governments. 
The hopes realized from Brown were not limited to the vision of black 
children now able to attend desegregated schools.  Brown also de-
legitimized the grip of “separate but equal” on public facilities of every 
kind by discrediting Plessy v. Ferguson, a case involving segregation of a 
railcar.9  In overturning Plessy, the Court encouraged blacks to believe that 
segregation could be, and would be, dismantled across the board in the 
United States. Thus, Brown became a launching pad for assaults upon 
broader aspects of segregation, as predicted in the Atlanta Declaration.10
The Montgomery, Alabama bus boycott that grew out of the weary but 
emboldened refusal by Mrs. Rosa Parks to give up her seat on a bus, was a 
shot heard around the nation.
   
11  The demand made upon her, which she 
rebuffed, was in accord with the public accommodation laws that blanketed 
the city of Montgomery and the state of Alabama.  Civil rights lawyers who 
had pulled the laboring oars in the school-desegregation cases rose to the 
occasion again to fight the jailing of Mrs. Parks, Dr. Martin Luther King, 
and others who challenged state and local segregation laws.  The strategy 
of combining implementation litigation with direct action challenges to 
public-accommodations segregation laws paid off.12
 
 9. 163 U.S. 537, 544 (1896).  In June 1892, Homer Plessy took a seat in a “whites 
only” train car in Louisiana.  Id.  When he refused the conductor’s orders to move to the 
“colored” train car as required under state law, Plessy was forcibly removed and jailed.  Id.  
He challenged the state law as a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, but the Supreme 
Court concluded that the constitutional guarantee of equal protection under the law was 
intended only “to enforce the absolute equality of the two races before the law” and not to 
enforce “a commingling of the two races upon terms unsatisfactory to either.”  Id.  The 
Court held that state laws “permitting, and even requiring, their separation, in places where 
they are liable to be brought into contact,” such as with the establishment of separate white 
and colored schools, “do not necessarily imply the inferiority of either race to the other, and 
have been generally, if not universally, recognized as within the competency of the state 
legislatures . . . .”  Id. 
  The broad initial 
hopes after Brown were justified when one considers the often powerful 
exercise of federal judicial power that was exerted to overcome the 
immediate resistance to the Court’s decision, along with the related 
 10. See Atlantic Declaration, supra note 2. 
 11. See Susan Dente Ross & R. Kenton Bird, The Ad That Changed Libel Law: Judicial 
Realism and Social Activism in N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 9 COMM. L. & POL’Y 489, 496 
(2004). 
 12. See id.; see also Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Brown I). 
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successes resulting from the bus boycott. 
It cannot be gainsaid that, during the decade after Brown, the progress 
toward desegregating American schools was slow and painful.  The federal 
courts, however, continued to uphold the rights of black children in a 
number of cases.13  By early 1970, litigation challenging dual systems had 
reached urban/metropolitan school systems of significant size.14  Those 
state actors in charge of the systems were slow to act and in most cases did 
not act without private individuals initiating litigation.  In 1971, in Swann 
v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, the Supreme Court made 
important pronouncements on the issue of neighborhood schools, quotas, 
and the use of transportation for desegregation.15  This decision established 
the “basic framework of urban desegregation law.”16
In Swann, the Supreme Court considered and approved the use of race-
sensitive remedies, questioned the sanctity of neighborhood schools as a 
justification for segregation, and agreed that transportation was an integral 
tool of public education.
 
17
Absent a constitutional violation, there would be no basis for judicially 
ordering assignments of students on a racial basis.  All things being equal, 
with no history of discrimination, it might well be desirable to assign 
pupils to schools nearest their homes.  But all things are not equal in a 
system that has been deliberately constructed and maintained to enforce 
racial segregation.  The remedy for such segregation may be 
administratively awkward, inconvenient and even bizarre in some 
situations; and may impose burdens on some; but all awkwardness and 
inconvenience cannot be avoided in the interim period when remedial 
adjustments are being made to eliminate the dual school system.
  In this highly significant opinion, authored by 
Chief Justice Warren Burger, the Court declared: 
18
The Swann decision, and the earlier decisions in Green v. County School 
Board of New Kent County
 
19 and Alexander v. Holmes,20
 
 13. See infra notes 45-46 and accompanying text. 
 were made by a 
toughened and clearly exasperated Supreme Court.  These decisions 
resulted in a body of remedial jurisprudence that promised to effectively 
transform school districts from segregated to desegregated.  Further, these 
decisions sustained the hopes born in 1954 with the original Brown decree. 
 14. Id. 
 15. 402 U.S. 1 (1971). 
 16. Jill Hirt, Current Federal Policies on School Desegregation: Constitutional Justice 
or Benign Neglect, 13 URB. REV. (1982) (on file with author). 
 17. See 402 U.S. 1. 
 18. Id. at 28. 
 19. 391 U.S. 430 (1968). 
 20. 396 U.S. 19 (1969). 
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Through the courage, perseverance, and sacrifice of black Americans, 
combined with the brilliant legal acumen of Charles Hamilton Houston, 
Thurgood Marshall, and their cadre of lawyers, the legal system became the 
instrument of change.21  Even though the Brown decision was vigorously 
resisted all across the South, a small group of committed federal judges 
emerged who met the resistance to Brown with a body of remedial 
jurisprudence.22  That required a judicial maturing process led by the 
Supreme Court and a handful of other federal courts, driven by lawyers 
who would not compromise on principle.  These lawyers pressed the 
Supreme Court to reconsider its “all deliberate speed” pace set out in 
Brown II in 1955.23
Political forces, however, began to subvert the process of implementing 
desegregation mandates.  Political leaders indifferent to the rights of black 
children—influenced heavily by some constituents’ stubborn insistence on 
returning to the pre-Brown status quo—engaged in a racial/political sleight-
of-hand that sunk its roots during the presidential campaign of George 
Wallace in 1972 and the presidencies of Richard Nixon and Ronald 
Reagan.  These leaders and others pretended to support the constitutional 
principle of equality laid down in Brown while denouncing the remedy 
needed to give it meaning.  It was akin to endorsing a war on cancer, but 
denouncing the surgery and medication needed to rid the body of it. 
 
The Southern strategy of the Nixon administration provides a good 
starting point.24  This administration made a number of attacks on the 
school desegregation remedy of transportation.25 President Nixon 
demagogued this issue, disparaging it ceaselessly as mere “busing.”26 On 
March 16, 1972, in a national television address, he announced the 
introduction of legislation to “call an immediate halt to all new busing 
orders by federal courts.”27  Nixon’s tactics forced Leon Panetta, director 
of the Office of Civil Rights of HEW, to resign.28  Panetta’s protests of the 
Administration’s policies had fallen on deaf ears.29
When Ronald Reagan commenced his 1980 campaign, he chose to give 
his kick-off address in Philadelphia, Mississippi, the small town where civil 
 
 
 21. See Jones, supra note 5, at 98. 
 22. See infra notes 46-49 and accompanying text. 
 23. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) (Brown II) (reargued on the 
question of relief). 
 24. Jones, supra note 5, at 101. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
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rights workers Andrew Goodman, Michael Schwerner, and James Chaney 
were murdered when they attempted to register blacks to vote in 1964.30  
Reagan supported “states’ rights” in the address, and his message could not 
have been more clear; he promised, in effect: I will do everything possible 
to prevent the federal government, including the federal courts, from 
protecting the rights of black children by implementing decisions such as 
Brown v. Board of Education.31
These leaders gave lip service to the rights of black Americans but 
exerted considerable pressure against any effective remedy to dismantle 
segregation in the schools.
 
32
The evils of segregation, set forth in histories such as the one presented 
in Briggs v. Elliott,
  Their legerdemain was designed to mislead 
Americans.  They recited facile platitudes about “equality and dignity for 
all” while undercutting remedies for the residual effects of segregation and, 
indeed, the residual effects of slavery.  They feigned ignorance as to the 
true import of their words, endorsing a national amnesia into which many 
Americans were willing to sink. 
33
It is important, however, that the appalling conditions that resulted under 
segregation must not be forgotten.  In Briggs, in which counsel for the 
NAACP exposed the conditions of the segregated schools in Clarendon 
County, South Carolina, the cruel reality of segregated schools was 
captured by Reverend James M. Hinton: 
 cannot be rationally disputed.  Yet over the course of 
the last few decades, the national amnesia about segregation’s realities 
would often be fueled, in no small measure, by those afflicted by it. 
The black schools of South Carolina were a disgrace.  In the first place, it 
was an ordeal to get to them because there were no buses for black 
children.  Was there any clearer way for whites to say they did not want 
the Negro to rise above his present station?  If the message was somehow 
not clear enough, the rickety schoolhouses themselves brought it home: 
small, dark, leaking all over, heated by coal stoves that sometimes 
smoked the children out of the building.  In most places, the state or 
community did not even pay for the schools to be put up or, as in 
Clarendon, for the coal or for even a single crayon.  All it paid was the 
teachers’ salaries, and in Clarendon County the average white teacher 
 
 30. John Herbers, Mississippi: A Profile of the Nation’s Most Segregated State, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 28, 1964, at E3. 
 31. See Jack White, Lott, Reagan, and Republican Racism, TIME ONLINE EDITION (Dec. 
14, 2002), at http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,399921,00.html (last visited 
Oct. 25, 2004). 
 32. See generally id. 
 33. 103 F. Supp. 920 (D.S.C. 1952), rev’d, Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) 
(Brown I). 
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earned two-thirds more than the average black one.  On top of the 
advanced state of dilapidation of the schoolhouses was the inevitable 
waste of time because so many of the rural schools had only one or two 
teachers, who could tend to only one of several classes at a time while the 
rest of the crowded room went uninstructed.34
The wretched conditions in Clarendon County were typical of the 
conditions that formed the legal vehicle that carried the issue of segregated 




The terrible effects of segregation on children were also described 
compellingly by the late Roy Wilkins in a Cleveland, Ohio speech.  He 
declared: 
 
[The states] instituted and wove into a smothering pattern a thousand 
different personal humiliations, both public and private, based upon color.  
Through legal and extra-legal machinery, through unchallenged political 
power, and through economic sanctions, a code of demeaning conduct 
was enforced with a cast down on children before they could dream, and 
eroded manhood after they came of age.36
The decision in Brown led black families to hope and trust that the 
smothering, humiliating, and demeaning effects of segregation would not 
be imposed on their children in the years to come, and many Americans, 
both black and white, expected that the spirit of freedom and justice would 
lead the country forward.  Indeed, as the NAACP noted in its Atlanta 
Declaration, the decision was a victory for the whole American people and 
as a vindication of America’s leadership of the free world.
 
37
BROWN GOES NORTH 
 
While attention was focused on desegregation attempts in the South, 
segregation in schools in the North and the West was not going unnoticed.  
Many thought Brown’s reach went no further than the States of the Old 
Confederacy, the Border States, and the District of Columbia.38  Because 
states in the North and West did not constitutionally or statutorily mandate 
such separation, it was contended that there was no affirmative duty to 
correct what was described as “de facto” racial separation in the schools.39
 
 34. RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 13-14 (1977). 
  
 35. See Brown I, 347 U.S. at 483. 
 36. Address at the Cleveland City Club Forum (April 16, 1960), reprinted in THE CRISIS 
259-260 (1977) (on file with author). 
 37. See Atlanta Declaration, supra note 2. 
 38. See Jones, supra note 5, at 102. 
 39. See infra notes 40-42. 
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That view was backed up by appellate court decisions in such cases as Bell 
v. School of Gary,40 Deal v. Cincinnati Board of Education,41 and Cragett 
v. Cleveland Board of Education,42
Realists continued to apply pressure, convinced that with respect to 
public schools, the distinction between “de facto” and “de jure” segregation 
was illusory.
 among others. 
43  If segregated conditions were to be exposed as resulting 
from state action sufficient to invoke the remedial power of the federal 
courts, a theory would have to be developed that would establish that 
predicate.44
By the early 1970’s, a number of cases in the North, based on just such a 
theory, were beginning to reach the decisional point.  In 1970, Judge 
Damon Keith ruled against the Pontiac School Board in favor of black 
plaintiffs.
 
45  A similar result was obtained in Pasadena, California.46
Also of significance was Lee v. Nyquist, in which a three-judge panel of 
the federal court struck down a New York State statute that prohibited the 
State’s education officials from assigning students to schools in such a way 
as to enhance racial balances.
 
47 At about the same time, the landmark case 
of Keyes v. School District No. 1 was filed and ultimately decided by the 
United States Supreme Court.48  Keyes was a landmark decision and 
greatly aided plaintiffs who sued urban Northern systems with their 
multiple school districts.  The Court followed Brown principles and held 
that a presumption of system-wide segregative intent arises where proof of 
intentional segregation in a significant portion of the system is shown and 
remains effectively unrefuted.49
Even with the Keyes presumption, however, plaintiffs nonetheless were 
required to prove intentional acts of segregation before any remedy could 




 40. 324 F.2d 209 (7th  Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 924 (1964). 
 This task required resources 
 41. 369 F.2d 55 (6th  Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 847 (1967). 
 42. 338 F.2d 941 (6th  Cir. 1964). 
 43. Jones supra note 5, at 102. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Davis v. School Dist., 443 F.2d 573 (6th  Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 913 
(1971). 
 46. Spangler v. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ., 311 F. Supp. 501 (D.C. Cal. 1970), 
intervention denied, 427 F.2d 1352 (9th  Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 943 (1971), 427 
U.S. 424 (1976). 
 47. 318 F. Supp. 710 (W.D.N.Y. 1970), aff’d, 402 U.S. 935 (1971). 
 48. 413 U.S. 189 (1973). 
 49. Id. at 227-28. 
 50. Id. 
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greater than individual, often impecunious, plaintiffs could muster.51  In the 
same manner as was done when Charles Houston was tackling the 
segregation at the graduate and professional school levels in the 1930’s and 
40’s, the individual plaintiffs sought help from civil rights organizations.52
Complicating the problem for black plaintiffs was the range of tools with 
which defendant school officials armed themselves.  They had, for 
example, the financial resources to employ top legal talent.  They had ready 
access to the media and the ability to exert considerable political leverage.  
In addition to engaging in forceful legal resistance in the courts, they could 
ignite backfires even within the minority community, through the use of 
such buzz terms as “forced busing” and “white flight.”  Nevertheless, the 
desire by black plaintiffs to challenge segregation in the public schools 
moved forward. 
 
As noted earlier, the inflammatory and divisive issue in the early 1970’s 
was clearly the issue of busing.  Fortunately, plaintiffs, with few 
exceptions, refused to capitulate.  The wonder is that more did not give up, 
given the climate that was created.  It was not until the affirmative-action 
case of Regents of University of California v. Bakke53 that many blacks and 
others who had been misled on the “forced busing” issue, began to 
understand that as a remedial tool, busing was indivisible from remedial 
techniques to correct other forms of discrimination.  They came to 
understand that to equivocate on the “busing” issue in school desegregation 
cases was to create vulnerability for the remedies needed in the related 
areas of employment, housing, voting rights, and the entire array of 
affirmative-action programs.  They came to realize that the problem was 
race—not a bus—given that white pupils by the thousands had been and 
were still being transported to school by buses every day.  Indeed school 
systems had used bus transportation to achieve segregation, transporting 
both white and black children to segregated schools.54
As we explore the efforts in the 1970’s aimed at overcoming racial 
segregation in urban schools, particularly in the North, it is helpful to 
understand the strategies that evolved.  First, it must be noted that in taking 
on urban school systems in the North, where plaintiffs were required to 
  Bakke demonstrated 
that where the remedy was racial in its objective, resistance was certain to 
follow.  The real heroes of the 1970’s are those litigants, students, parents, 
and judges who did not and still do not compromise on the issue of remedy. 
 
 51. See Jones, supra note 5, at 102. 
 52. See Tatel, supra note 6, at 1088. 
 53. See 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
 54. See PAUL R. DIMOND, BEYOND BUSING, INSIDE THE CHALLENGE TO URBAN 
SEGREGATION 5 (1985). 
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prove intentional racial discrimination by public officials, an enormous 
allocation of resources was necessary, as was the development of 
specialized skills beyond those usually employed in the ordinary civil 
rights case.55  Plaintiffs were obliged to compile immense histories and 
statistical analyses to show how deliberate choices in school construction, 
feeder patterns, grade levels, boundary-drawing, student assignments, 
faculty assignments, and other administrative practices served to cause and 
maintain segregation.56  Establishing the interdependence of housing 
segregation, school zones, and employment discrimination is complicated, 
expensive, and time consuming.  When undertaken, however, these efforts 
permitted the presentation to courts of proof that led to a string of 
significant victories.57  These cases brought by private parties kept alive the 
drive for segregation during periods, particularly the early 1970’s, when 
federal governmental policies were hostile to desegregation attempts.58
The metropolitan or interdistrict approach to school desegregation posed 
an even more complex set of problems for litigators in the 1970’s.  The 
Detroit experience best demonstrates those complexities.  First, the 
financial requirements were daunting.  Even in the single-district school 
cases, proving intent required more resources than most plaintiffs had.
  
Plaintiffs, for the most part, had to carry the battle alone, often in the face 
of this governmental opposition. 
59  
Second, the political climate was hostile.  Though the Nixon and Ford 
Administrations professed support for the holding in Brown I, they resisted 
the remedies necessary to give it meaning.60  The Justice Department and 
the Office of Civil Rights of the Department of Health, Education, and 
Welfare were much more willing to give Brown meaning when the Carter 
administration came to power in 1977.61  By that time, however, Congress 
had badly weakened the administrative capacity to use Title VI of the 1964 
Civil Rights Act to desegregate through the congressional enactment of a 
number of anti-busing amendments.62
Among the most intriguing strategies were those conjured up by anti-
busing forces in the Seattle and Los Angeles school districts.  The use of 
busing in Seattle was attacked through the use of statewide initiative and 
 
 
 55. See Jones, supra note 5, at 102. 
 56. See id. 
 57. Id. at 103. 
 58. See supra notes 24-29 and accompanying text. 
 59. See DIMOND, supra note 54, at 25. 
 60. See id. at 97. 
 61. Jones, supra note 5, at 104. 
 62. Id. 
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referendum, and the state constitutional standard to obtain a remedy in 
California courts was severely blunted.63
Equal to the drama and importance of the developments in the West 
during the 1970’s and 80’s were the events in Michigan, Ohio, and 
Massachusetts.  Interesting remedial principles were honed and reaffirmed 
on appeal.  The developments in the Detroit case, however, appeared to 
offer the greatest hope of breaking the back of Northern school segregation.  
As general counsel for the NAACP, I oversaw this and the other Northern 
cases, and argued both of the Detroit appeals in the United States Supreme 
Court. 
 
In June 1970, shortly after Governor William Milliken signed Michigan 
Act 48 into law, suspending a voluntary desegregation plan by the Detroit 
Board of Education, the Detroit Branch of the NAACP asked me to provide 
assistance from the national office in filing suit to enjoin the enforcement 
of the law.  Detroit School Board members who had voted for the plan 
were targeted for recall and were in fact removed from office, which had 
also occurred in Dayton, Ohio.  When their replacements took over, the 
new majority chose to put in place a magnet plan that would have 
perpetuated pupil segregation to a significant degree.  Following a meeting 
with lawyers for the plaintiffs and the school board, I decided that the 
NAACP would initiate a lawsuit on behalf of its Detroit branch to enjoin 
the enforcement of Act 48 and compel a re-activation of the suspended 
desegregation plan.  That was the beginning of Milliken v. Bradley.64
The trial judge was the late Judge Stephen Roth of the U.S. District 
Court for the Eastern District of Michigan.
 
65  Counsel for the NAACP and 
black plaintiffs presented him with an application for a temporary 
restraining order (“TRO”) and preliminary injunction.66  He reacted with 
considerable hostility.  Upon denying the request for a TRO, he scheduled 
a hearing on the preliminary injunction request.67  After hearing testimony, 
Judge Roth denied the plaintiffs any relief, whereupon plaintiffs filed an 
immediate appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.68  The 
appellate court scheduled an emergency hearing, after which it agreed with 
the plaintiffs that Act 48 was unconstitutional.69
 
 63. See Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 457 (1982); see also 
Crawford v. Bd. of Educ., 458 U.S. 527 (1982). 
  The Act interfered with 
 64. 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (Milliken I). 
 65. See DIMOND, supra note 54, at 100. 
 66. Id. at 32. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 74. 
 69. Id. 
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local attempts to comply with the Constitution’s equal protection clause as 
determined in Brown, in the same manner as had been done in the South, 
through interposition and nullification.  The case was remanded for further 
proceedings.70
During the ensuing trial, which lasted for forty-one days, the hostility of 
Judge Roth melted; he was sufficiently impressed with the plaintiff’s 
evidence to find against the Detroit Board of Education and the State of 
Michigan in a decision supported by numerous findings of fact.  On 
September 27, 1971, Judge Roth held: 
 
Pupil racial segregation . . . and the residential racial segregation resulting 
primarily from public and private racial discrimination are interdependent 
phenomena.  The affirmative obligation of the defendant Board has been 
and is to adopt and implement pupil assignment practices and policies that 
compensate for and avoid incorporation into the school system the effects 
of residential racial segregation.  The Board’s building upon housing 
segregation violates the Fourteenth Amendment.71
This decision was a pivotal development in the battle against school 
segregation.  It revealed a potential formula for breaking down northern 
urban segregation by linking evidence of educational and residential 
segregation. 
 
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit, sitting en banc, upheld Judge Roth’s 
findings.  The court concluded: 
This record contains a substantial volume of testimony concerning local 
and State action and policies which helped produce residential segregation 
in Detroit and in the metropolitan areas of Detroit.  In affirming the 
District Judge’s findings of constitutional violations by the Detroit Board 
of Education and by the State defendants resulting in segregated schools 
in Detroit, we have not relied at all upon testimony pertaining to 
segregated housing except as school construction programs helped cause 
or maintain such segregation.72
With regard to the need for interdistrict relief, the Court of Appeals held 
 
 
 70. The Sixth Circuit held the Act unconstitutional but affirmed the denial of a 
preliminary injunction and remanded for a trial on the merits.  433 F.2d 897 (6th Cir. 1970).  
On remand, Judge Roth again refused to grant a preliminary injunction, and the Sixth 
Circuit court affirmed, again directing a trial on the merits.  438 F.2d 945 (6th Cir. 1971). 
 71. Bradley v. Milliken, 338 F. Supp. 582, 593 (D.C. Mich. 1971).  Judge Roth’s 
findings included an explicit finding that both the State of Michigan and the Detroit Board 
had committed “acts which have been causal factors in the segregated condition of the 
public schools of the City of Detroit.”  Id. at 592. 
 72. Bradley v. Milliken, 484 F.2d 215, 242 (6th Cir. 1973) (en banc) (affirming both the 
finding of de jure segregation and the propriety of an interdistrict remedy).  The Supreme 
Court granted certiorari and reversed in part.  See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) 
(Milliken I). 
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that the only feasible desegregation plan would require pupil assignments 
that crossed the boundaries between the city and suburban school 
districts.73  The court concluded that an effective desegregation plan 
required a disregard of artificial barriers, especially where, as here, the state 
government had helped create and maintain racial segregation using those 
district boundary lines.74
The instant case calls up haunting memories of the now long overruled 
and discredited ‘separate-but-equal’ doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson.  If we 
hold that school district boundaries are absolute barriers to a Detroit 
school desegregation plan, we would be opening a way to nullify Brown 
v. Board of Education which overruled Plessy.
  Liability having been found, all-out relief 
required an interdistrict approach, consistent with precedents in Southern 
cases.  Chief Judge George Edwards framed the judicial challenge in this 
way: 
75
The decisions by the trial court and the appellate court met a fate in the 
Supreme Court that proved to be a turning point in the judicial 
implementation of school desegregation.  A review of that case illustrates 
what can only be regarded as the demise of the metropolitan school 
desegregation strategy. 
 
In its 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court affirmed with respect to the 
findings of intradistrict segregation, but it reversed the portion of the 
holding dealing with the interdistrict remedy.76  Writing for the majority, 
Chief Justice Warren Burger declared, “We conclude that the relief . . . was 
based upon an erroneous standard and was unsupported by record evidence 
that acts of the outlying districts effected the discrimination found to exist 
in the schools of Detroit.”77  The conclusion of the Court was based on a 
rejection of the principle that gave state control over local education in 
Michigan.78  It attributed to the local educational administrative units that 
the state created a degree of independence heretofore unrecognized, even in 
Michigan.79
 
 73. Bradley, 484 F.2d at 249. 
  This was a profound limitation on the reach of Green and 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 250. 
 76. Milliken I, 418 U.S. at 717; see Jones note 5, at 103. 
 77. Milliken I, 418 U.S. at 718.  The Court held the district court had no equitable power 
to include in its remedial decree any school district whose racial composition had not been 
shown to be the product of de jure segregation.  The defendants did not, however, challenge 
the district court’s finding of de jure segregation within the city of Detroit.  Accordingly, the 
Court remanded the case for formulation of a Detroit-only remedial decree.  Id.; see Jones, 
note 5, at 103. 
 78. Milliken I, 418 U.S. at 718; see Jones, supra note 5, at 103. 
 79. Milliken I, 418 U.S. at 718; see Jones, supra note 5, at 103. 
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Swann. 
Justice Potter Stewart concurred, providing the critical fifth vote.80  He 
emphasized the aspects which to him would have led to an approval of an 
interdistrict remedy.81  He described the containment segregation of black 
children within Detroit as caused by “unknown and perhaps unknowable 
factors . . . .”82  He was unable to discover any evidence in the record that 
would lead to a conclusion that “the State or its political subdivisions have 
contributed to cause the situation to exist,” or that the situation was caused 
by “governmental activity.”83
While this decision was a serious setback, it did not block the efforts to 
proceed against segregation within single districts.  In a number of 
instances in Michigan and elsewhere with generally favorable results, 
single district cases were pursued.
  His conclusion appeared to contradict or 
ignore the specific findings of fact made by Judge Roth as to the causes of 
the segregated conditions in the Detroit metropolitan schools—a review of 
the total record would have shown that the causes were established, and 
that actions by both state and local governments had effected segregation of 
the schools. 
84
The Detroit case in Milliken continued on remand.  After the trial court 
ruled on an intradistrict remedy, the case found its way back to the 
Supreme Court in Milliken II.
 
85  The issue on this appeal was whether the 
state, having explicitly been found culpable (along with the local board) for 
maintaining segregation within Detiot, could be required to share in the 
cost of the remedy.86  Specifically, the Supreme Court addressed the issue 
of the Eleventh Amendment and the state’s contention that it was shielded 
by that amendment from having to pay from the treasury the funds ordered 
by the district court and affirmed by the Sixth Circuit.87
 
 80. See Milliken I, 418 U.S. at 753 (Stewart, J., concurring); see Jones, supra note 5, at 
103. 
  The Court held to 
the contrary—that the State, having been found liable, could be required to 
help pay the cost of remedying the dual system, and this extended to 
 81. See Jones, supra note 5, at 103. 
 82. Milliken I, 418 U.S. at 756.  His comment appeared to contradict or ignore the 
specific findings of fact made by Judge Roth as to the causes of segregated conditions in the 
Detroit metropolitan schools.  See Jones, supra note 5, at 103. 
 83. Milliken I, 418 U.S. at 756; see Jones, supra note 5, at 103. 
 84. Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 459 (1979); Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. 
Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526 (1979); Oliver v. Kalamazoo Bd. of Educ., 706 F.2d 757 (6th Cir. 
1983); Reed v. Rhodes, 607 F.2d 714 (6th  Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 935 (1980). 
 85. Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977) (Milliken II). 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 290. 
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underwriting the cost of ancillary educational relief.88  Thus, Michigan was 
ordered to pay half of the $56 million for vocational programs and to make 
annual payments of $5.8 million for such educational relief as in-service 
training, reading programs, guidance and counseling, and community 
relations.89
Thus, Milliken II provided immense benefits to all children in the urban 
district, which was heavily composed of minority students.  The Court did 
what the political branches in Michigan had refused to do—support the 
rights of minority children, at least in part.  The decision also proved to be 
the basis for a number of subsequent courts to order ancillary relief, with 
states being required to contribute substantial sums of money.
 
90
In Milliken II, the Supreme Court reconfirmed the funding orders.  With 
firm language, it restated its view of the proven, widespread manifestations 
of intentional school segregation: that “discriminatory student assignment 
policies can themselves manifest and breed other inequalities built into a 
dual system founded on racial discrimination.”
  The 
implications of Milliken II seemed lost, however, on those who argued that 
school-desegregation litigation was a waste of time and money, and did 
nothing to enhance the quality of education being offered minority 
children.  There is no doubt that, at least for a time, without the Court 
orders here, the funding for the programs developed as a part of ancillary 
relief would not have been forthcoming. 
91
Children who have been thus educationally and culturally set apart from 
the larger community will inevitably acquire habits of speech, conduct, 
and attitudes reflecting their cultural isolation.  They are likely to acquire 
speech habits, for example, which vary from the environment in which 
they must ultimately function and compete, if they are to enter and be a 
part of that community.
  Explicitly recognizing 
some of the “inequalities . . . which flow from a long standing segregation 
system,” the Court found: 
92
Clearly the Milliken II court held that, to the extent these personal 
variations exist in the segregated pupils, those responsible for maintaining 
the segregation must fashion ancillary programs of remedy as a part of the 




 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 293. 
 90. See United States Bd. of School Comm’rs, 677 F.2d 1185 (7th  Cir. 1982); see also 
Oliver v. Kalamazoo Bd. of Educ., 640 F.2d 782 (6th Cir. 1980). 
 91. 433 U.S. at 283. 
 92. Id. at 287. 
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Despite the benefits that flowed from the litigation, it was clear that the 
decision regarding interdistrict relief was a severe setback.  An early 
warning of the dire consequences if the Supreme Court reversed Milliken 
was sounded by Judge Skelly Wright of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia.93  Speaking at the Harvard Law School on the 
twentieth anniversary of Brown, Judge Wright predicted that if the 
Supreme Court were to hold that interdistrict relief was impermissible, “the 
national trend toward residential, political and economic apartheid” would 
not only be “greatly accelerated,” it would be “rendered legitimate and 
irreversible by force of law.”94
Likewise, the four dissenting justices in Milliken did not allow the 
majority’s opinion to stand unchallenged.  Justice Douglas, for one, 
declared: “When we rule against the metropolitan area remedy we take a 
step that will likely put the problems of Blacks and our society back to the 




Today’s holding, I fear, is more a reflection of a perceived public mood 
that we have gone far enough in enforcing the Constitution’s guarantee of 
equal justice than it is a product of neutral principles of law.  In the short 
run, it may seem to be the easier course to allow our great metropolitan 
areas to be divided up each into two cities, one white, the other black—
but it is a course, I predict, our people will ultimately regret.
  Yet that is exactly what the Supreme Court majority did.  No 
one was more prophetic than another of the dissenters, Justice Thurgood 
Marshall, whose words continue to resonate to this day.  He wrote: 
96
On remand to the Sixth Circuit, Judge George Edwards strongly lamented 
the Supreme Court’s ruling with these words: 
 
I join my colleagues in the drafting and issuance of today’s Order because 
any final decision of the United States Supreme Court is the law of the 
land.  But conscience compels me to record how deeply I disagree with 
the decision which we are enforcing.  In Milliken v. Bradley . . . , the 
Supreme Court overruled this court and the fully documented finding of 
fact that racial desegregation in the schools of Detroit could not be 
accomplished within the boundaries of the Detroit school district . . . .  
The decision also imbued school district boundaries in Northern states 
(which, like Michigan, had never had school segregation laws) with a 
constitutional significance which neither federal nor state law had ever 
 
 93. Notes of the author, who attended the anniversary program and heard Judge 
Wright’s address. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Bradley v. Milliken, 418 U.S. 717, 759 (1974) (Milliken I) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
 96. Id. at 814-15 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
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accorded them.97
In the long term, Judge Roth has been proven correct.  His findings that a 
desegregation order limited only to Detroit would not stand for long and 
that multi-district metropolitan desegregation was necessary for an 
effective remedy have both been borne out.  So too have the predictions of 
Judge Wright and Justices Marshall and Douglas been proved accurate.  




Various school reform strategies that target aspects of education have 
been advanced as a panacea for the failure to deal with Brown, with charter 
school and voucher programs leading the way.
 
99
Unless we do, the hopes to which Brown gave birth will die.  As the 
commitment for desegregation of schools clearly loses momentum, a 
rationale has surfaced for turning a blind eye to the separate and 
inadequately funded schools in which black children find themselves. 
  What is really needed is 
for advocates of desegregation to question the legality of states ceding their 
authority for public education to unaccountable groups of persons who 
implement racially isolated schools, as is the case with charter schools.  We 
must again exalt the value of integrated education, and the obligation of the 
judiciary to be true to the Constitution.  We must also read with new eyes 
the bold decisions that squarely overturned Plessy and the “separate but 
equal” doctrine.  As we join the current struggle over disparity of race and 
educational resources it is essential to gain and act on our historical 
understanding of Brown. 
Some blacks have been recorded as pining for the “good old days” of 
segregation when “we had our own schools.”  In support of that nostalgia, 
reference is made to the handful of segregated schools that were the clear 
exceptions to the dreadfulness associated with segregated schools.  The 
children exposed to the Clarendon County, South Carolina schools 
experienced anything but “exceptional” schools.100
What is particularly distressing during the fiftieth anniversary of Brown 
is the extent to which revisionists, even now, try to convince contemporary 
Americans that it is somehow unconstitutional for the courts to be involved 
in efforts to make Brown real.  Clothing themselves in constitutional 
righteousness, they profess to support color-blind policies in education, 
 
 
 97. Bradley v. Milliken, 519 F.2d 679, 680 (6th  Cir. 1975) (Edwards, J., concurring). 
 98. GARY ORFIELD ET AL., HARVARD PROJECT ON SCHOOL DESEGREGATION, DEEPENING 
SEGREGATION IN AMERICAN PUBLIC SCHOOLS 115 (1997); Bill Bush, Separate and Unequal, 
COLUMBUS DISPATCH, June 25, 2000, at 1A. 
 99. See ORFIELD ET AL, supra note 98, at 355. 
 100. See KLUGER, supra, note 34 and accompanying text. 
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rather than supporting racially sensitive remedies designed to redress the 
documented violations of black children’s constitutional rights. 
Educational policies that ignore the color of students are, of course, the 
ultimate goal.  Anyone living in the United States who thinks that our 
institutions have achieved color-blind status, however, is hiding from 
reality or is a wishful simpleton.  The fact is, race remains a barrier.  In 
fact, race matters.  It is incontrovertible that a disproportionate number of 
children of color attend inadequate schools.  The vestiges of slavery and 
law-enforced humiliation and inferiority still exist.  Therefore, remedies 
that take race into account are necessary and justifiable.  But, although 
remedies that take race into account are aimed at achieving constitutional 
equality, adversaries contend that these remedies are unconstitutional 
because they take race into account.  As a result, advocates pressing for an 
end to racism via racially sensitive remedies are themselves labeled racists. 
When race-based remedies are challenged on the basis of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, an irony arises that is intolerable to those who fought for civil 
rights––under the banner of the Constitution––for so many decades, and for 
those who are still fighting the battle for equality in the United States.  
Those who argue that the struggle for desegregated schools should be 
abandoned and that black Americans should fight for schools that may be 
separate but are equal, have fallen victim to the national amnesia under 
which the appalling conditions of segregation have been forgotten.  Schools 
that are systematically and intentionally separated by race, with one set of 
schools for white children and another set for children of color, are 
inherently unequal.  That was the truth recognized in Brown.  Those who 
argue for abandoning the struggle for desegregation have either forgotten 
the degrading realities of segregation, or perhaps they have given up in the 
wake of the Supreme Court’s betrayal of their hopes, again. 
Rather than give up, the new challenges must be faced.  These include 
confronting the issue of inadequate school financing.  School reforms that 
do not address racial segregation and inadequate funding of schools are 
merely a back door to reintroduce what Brown outlawed—segregated, 
inferior education.  For that to occur during the fiftieth anniversary of 
Brown would be unconscionable; it would not only betray the hopes 
imbedded in the Atlanta Declaration, but dishonor the sacrifices of those 
who fought to put Plessy in its grave. 
 
